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ABSTRACT 
It is well—known that real benefits in the major cash  transfer program in 
the U.S.——the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)  program——have 
fallen  drastically over  the past twenty years.  State legislatures,  which set 
AFDC benefit levels, have failed to increase nominal benefits to keep up  with 
inflation, resulting in a 25  percent decline in real benefits between 1960 and 
1984.  The most popular explanation for this  decline is that state 
legislatures,  reflecting the changing  preferences of  voters,  have grown more 
conservative in  their tastes for redistribution.  The evidence presented in 
this paper is consistent instead with a different explanation, that 
legislatures  have let federally—financed  Food Stamps displace state—financed 
AFDC benefits.  A  similar displacement  of AFDC by  Medicaid benefits appears to 
have occurred.  Aside from implying that preferences for redistribution  have 
not in  fact changed, the results also show that the total transfer  benefit has 
increased, as should be expected from growing income levels.  The findings 
also imply that neither the Food Stamp program nor,  presumably, any other 
lump—sum transfer provided by  Congress is likely to  have any effect on  the 
incomes of  the poor female-head population.  Instead,  such programs will 
merely provide budget relief to the states. 
Robert  Moffitt 
Department of Economics 
Brown University 
Providence, RI 02912 
(401)-863—2779 I.  INTRODUCTION 
The decline in real  AFOC benefits  over  the  1970s  and 19805 is  one of the 
most widely—noted trends  in the U.S. welfare system in recent years.  It has 
been used  as part of the explanation for the reversal in the historic  decline 
in  poverty rates, for poverty rates started rising around 1980.  It  is often 
cited in  the popular press as  evidence for a growing conservative climate,  and 
it  is currently playing a role in welfare reform discussions in  Washington 
over arguments  for a federally-mandated minimum  state  AFDC benefit.  It has 
also been used  as an argument  against  the  thesis that  AFDC destabilizes 
marital  unions, for the rise in the divorce  rate and the rate of female— 
headedness  in  the U.S. has  occurred over the same  period  that  AFDC  benefits 
have fallen. 
The alternate  explanation explored in  this paper is that  the decline 
reflects  a substitution of  federally—funded  Food  Stamp benefits for partially 
state—funded  AFDC benefits.  State legislatures, which set the level of AFDC 
benefits, must pay approximately 40 percent of the marginal costs of benefit 
increases  after federal matching.  On the other hand, Food Stamp benefits are 
set by  the U.S. Congress  arid  are an  externally provided extra benefit from the 
point of  view of state legLslatures.  If  it is the  total transfer to its poor 
that enters  the state utility function  (or the utility function of the median 
voter), Food Stamp benefits will displace AFDC dollars on a  one—for—one 
basis.  The decline in real  AFOC  benefits thus could be a result of the 
increase in Food  Stamp benefits that occurred over the 1970s and 1980s. —2— 
This hypothesis has been  examined previously by Huiten et  al. (1982), 
Gramiich  (1982), Orr (1979), and plotnick and Winters  (1985).  Orr found that 
Food Stamps substituted for AFDC  benefits on a  one—for-one basis while 
Gramlich and Piotnick—Winters  found there to be  no substitution.  Hulten at 
al. found evidence of substitution but stressed the extreme non—robustness of 
the models  that have been  used,  The variance in  results in  these studies may 
be, in  part, a reflection of a  key  difficulty in  testing the hypothesis.  The 
Food Stamp benefit schedule is uniform in the nation as a whole, hence a 
cross—Section regression of  state—specific AFDC benefits on a standardized 
Food Stamp benefit is not possible.  Moreover, the number of  time periods 
available over the 1970s and 1980s is too small to  conduct a reliable time— 
series analysis, and the evidence is strong that the states were not in 
equilibrium in those years anyway.  The previous studies attempted to 
circumvent this problem by  using various sources of cross—sectional variation 
in  the Food Stamp benefit actually paid out in  a state to  achieve 
identification of the Food Stamp substitution effect.  However, the validity 
of using such variation to measure the substitution effect is subject to 
question and, in  any case, the amount of such variation is small. 
In this paper a  more  direct method of  attack is taken.  Cross-sectional 
regressions of PFDC benefits are estimated at  a point in  time (1960)  prior to 
the introduction of Food Stamps, and  the results are then  used  to forecast the 
sum of  AFDC and Food Stamps at  a later time (viz., in  1984).  If the 
substitution hypothesis  is correct, the 1960 regression should correctly 
forecast the later sum.  This method, while direct, is  also fairly heroic. 
Time—series forecasts from cross—sectional regressions are notoriously  poor and, in  this case, there is art additional difficulty created by the 
transforoation of the 11.5. welfare system between 1960 and 1984, making  it 
perhaps unlikely that there has been no  structural change n  the PFOC  benefit 
equation.  Sut the  possibly quixotic nature of the exercise also sakes it  a 
much  stronger test of the hypothesis than has been previously attempted. 
The results indicate surprisingly strong support for the substitution 
hypothesis.  Forecasts of  the AFOC—Food Stamp sum to  1984 are only artout $60 
per month higher than the actual sum, relative to a drop  in the real AFDC 
benefit of $120 per month since 1960 (1982 dollars).  When the Medicaid 
program is introduced, a stronger set of results is obtained.  The AFOC 
benefit in 1960 was $200 per month lower than the sum of AFDC,  Food Stamps, 
and Medicaid in  1984;  but a backcast of the 1960 AFDC benefit from a 1984 
regression with  the benefit sum as the dependent variable comes within  $9 of 
the 1960 AFDC benefit.  Finally, almost all tests conducted on 1960 and 1984 
differences find that the null of no  structural change cannot be  rejected. 
In the next section of  the paper, the background time—series trends in 
the AFOC benefit, and in variables that might have caused its decline, are 
discussed.  The models and econometric methods used to test the Food Stamp 
hypothesis are discussed in  Section III, followed by a presentation of the 
main results in Section  IV.  A supplementary analysis of the AFDCU program 
(that for which males are eligible) is  reported in  Section V.  1  summary and a 
discussion of  the policy implications of the paper are provided in the last 
section. —4— 
II.  TIME-SERIES AND INSTITUTIONAL BAQCGROUND 
A relative brief graphical exposition of the relevant trends should 
provide a proper context for the econometric work.  The dramatic reduction in 
real AFDC benefits since the late 1960s is illustrated in Figure 1  •  As  the 
figure  indicates,  the  real  benefit grew  steadily into the early 196Ds and 
accelerated slightly in the mid—1960s.  But around 1967 or 1968, the benefit 
increase came to a  halt  and benefits took a sharp nosedive, setting off a fall 
which continued all the way to  1981 .  Since  1981  the benefit has leveled off 
end has remained essentially constant. 
That changes in the U.S. politicsl climate leading to more conservative 
policies occurred at  about the same time as the benefit decline leads to the 
obvious hypothesis that the benefit reduction has resulted from changes in 
preferences toward redistribution.  State legislatures, which set AFOC 
benefits, are traditionally more conservative then the Congress in any case 
and could be  argued to  be  particularly susceptible to  changes in  the attitudes 
of voters.  Nevertheless,  there could be  economic causes of the change as 
well, and these clearly need to  be  explored. 
One such alternative hypothesis is suggested by the trend in the AFDC 
csselosd, also shown in  Figure 1.  The increase in the benefit in the early 
1960s was followed shortly thereafter by en  explosion in the AFDC caseload, 
for the number of  AFDC families per capita almost tripled over the six years 
between 1966 and 1972.  Although the caseload has since leveled off, the 































































































































































































































caseload increase.  As should be  quite intuitive, and as  will ha  demonstrated 
formally below, the caseload is effectively  the price of the benefit; 
consequently, the caseload explosion represented  a 300 percent increase in  the 
price of AFOC benefits.1 
This caseload increase suggests that the states oey have allowed reel 
benefits to  decline simply in order to  keep  reel AFDC expenditures by the 
states constant, or at  least growing in  line with income.  However, the 
benefit decline wee more than what was necessary to do so.  AFDC  expenditures 
leveled off in  the late lg6Os and early 197Cc and then declined in absolute 
terms after about  1g73,  as  should be  clear  from the caseload end benefit 
trends in Figure 1  ,  A  fortiori,  MDC  expenditures declined am  a fraction of 
state revenues (more on this momentarily).  Whether this should be  expected or 
not  depends upon whether the price elasticity of the benefit does or does not 
exceed one. 
Another potential source of  the benefit reduction ie the well—known 
reduction in the growth rate of real income over the 197Cc.  As shown in 
Figure 2, real income per capita in the U.S. grew  during the 197Dm but at  a 
slower rate than in  the 1960s and earlier.  Whether this income sloflown is 
sufficiently large to  explain the benefit decline  is an  empirical question, of 
course, and will be  examined below.  eut it  is coneimtent with the growth 
pattern of  per capita state and local revenues, also shown in the figure, 
which  flattened out markedly in  the 1970s.  Naturally, along with  the eloown 
in revenue growth came a slowdown in  expenditure growth.  Figure 3  shows the 
trend in  the per capita budget surplus, which indirectly reflects expenditure 
trende,  Surprisingly, the budget surplus in the state and local sector 
actually increased over  the 1970s, implying that expenditure growth declined 1950  1955  1960  1965  1970  197  1980  1985 
Year 
Figure  2 
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2 —9  — 
by more than that  of revenues  (and  that there was no  long—term change in 
'fiscal distress', as it is called in the  literature, in  that sector). 
Nevertheless, despite this decline in growth of  state and local expenditures, 
expenditures on  AFDC fell even  more  and even in  absolute terms.  As a 
consequence, AFDC expenditures fell  as a share of total state and local 
expenditures, as  shown in Figure 3.  Thus the decline in the AFDC benefit 
could not have been  wholly a result of general revenue and expenditure 
decline. 
An additional hypothesis for the decline in the AFDC benefit is a 
reduction in  the generosity of  federal matching for AFDO  benefits.  t'tchng 
rates for AFDC did indeed decline over the period but the reductions were 
quite small in  absolute terms——from a mean of  58 percent to one of  56 percent 
for the regular AFDC matching rate and from 62  percent  to 59 percent for the 
Niedicaid  matching rate.  It will require a large price elasticity for these 
reductions  to generate the drastic decline in  the AFDC  benefit observed. 
The alternative hypotheses to  be  examined in  detail here are those 
relating to the possible substitution of non—AFDC benefits for the AFDC 
benefit.  The most prominent source of such effects is the possible 
substitution of federally—financed Food stamp benefits for state—financed AFDC 
benefits.  The Food Stamp program was introduced in  the mid—1960s as an option 
to the states and grew slowly until 1974, when  congress mandated that all 
states  implement the program in  all their counties.  As shown in Table  1 ,  the 
AFDC  guarantee——the amount actually set by  state legislatures-—declined 
rapidly after the introduction of Food  Stamps; in fact,  the  real AFDC 
guarantee  was 25 percent lower in  1984 than it had been  in  1960.2  On the 
other hand, real Food Stamp benefits, while fluctuating over  the 1970s and 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.—  11.  — 
constant,  no  doubt because they were indexed to inflation by  Congress in 
1972.  In  any case, the sum of real AFDC and Food Stamp benefits in  1984 was 
$622 per month, almost 30  percent higher  than that for AFDC alone  in  1960. 
The hypothesis that States have allowed Food Stamps to  substitute for 
AFDC benefits in a one-for-one ratio has several elements supporting it. 
First, until 1979 AFDC  recipients were automatically eligible for Food  Stamps, 
regardless of  income,  and hence almost all AFDC  recipients received  them. 
Since 1979, when  .FDC recipients began  to  be  certified for Food Stamps on the 
basis of their income and assets, a high proportion have  still received 
them.  Second, in  most states Food Stamp certification of  AFDC recipients 
takes place physically in  the AFOC offices themselves, providing strong 
programs.  Third,  the cash equivalent value 
same as their market value, making it 
worse off by having food transfers 
motivation  for integration of  the 
of Food Stamps is essentially the 
unlikely that recipients would be 
substituted  for cash  transfers. 
Nevertheless,  the details of the the Food Stamp benefit formula imply 
that simply  summing AFDC and Food  Stamp  benefits together  is not quite 
correct.  The  Food  Stamp  program taxes  AFDC  benefits at approximately a  30 
percent  rate, lowering the net income increment provided by the program by 30 
percent of the AFDC  amount.  Hence, an increase in the AFOC benefit of $1 
would raise disposable income of  the recipient by only  70  cents.  .s shown in 
Table 1, the net sum of AFOC and Food Stamps in  1984 is only $505 per month, 
only  5 percent higher than  the value of AFDC  alone in 1960.  This is a rather 
small increase over  the twenty—four years, given  the much higher levels of 
taxpayer income in  1984. —  12  — 
This  taxation also  implies that a reduction in  the state AFDC benefit by 
one dollar would  lower the net transfer to female—headed families in the state 
by only 70 cents.  Thus an  additional incentive for state  legislatures to let 
the real AFDC benefit decline is provided. 
A  second source of  benefit substitution that may have occurred is the 
substitution of Medicaid benefits for AFDC.  The Medicaid program was 
introduced by the U.S. Congress in  1965 and grew  rapidly over the late 1960s 
and 1970s, at the same time that AFUC benefits were declining.  AFDC 
recipients are categorically eligible for Medicaid benefits so  that, even 
though not all receive medical care in  any given time interval, all are 
essentially covered by health  insurance and hence should be thought of as 
receiving a transfer.  As in the AFDC program, state legislatures pay for 
Medicaid expenditures but they  are matched by  the federal government at  the 
Medicaid matching rate referred to earlier.  Mowever, unlike AFDC, the basic 
set of medical services provided to  recipients is mandated by  the federal 
government.  Although states can supplement the basic set, and can even  in 
some circumstances put  restrictions on the basic set (e.g.,  by limits on 
hospital days), it  is nevertheless the case that the core of Medicaid 
expenditures are mandated by the federal government and hence are not under 
the control of the states. 
As Table  1  shows, the Medicaid benefit (i.e., its insurance value) grew 
in  the early 1970s and declined in  the later 1970s.  The latter decline was 
the result of sharp increases in medical care inflation and consequent 
reductions in service delivery.  By  1984, the sum of  AFDC, Food Stamps and 
Medicaid was $785 per month, over  60 percent greater than the value of AFDC 
alone in 1960.  Taking into acoount the taxation of  AFDC by  the Food Stamp —  13  — 
program,  the net sum of  the three benefits was $669 per month in  1984, 39 
percent higher than the value of AFDC alone in 1960. 
A further source of possible benefit substitution, also  related to the 
Medicaid program, is the substitution of  non-  C  Medicaid benefits for AFDC— 
related benefits.  AFDC recipients account for only  25 percent of Medicaid 
expenditures, the other 75 percent consisting predominately of the aged and 
the disabled.  The average Medicaid benefit for the aged  is about double that 
for AFDC families and that  for the disabled is about triple that for AFDC 
families.  The explosion in medical care prices in  the 19705 led to tremendous 
growth in non—AFDC Medicaid expenditures, particularly for nursing home 
care.  As shown in Figure 4, non-AFUC Medicaid expenditures per capita grew 
strongly all the way into the late 1970s, until medical care  inflation once 
more generated service reductions.  As concerns AFOC benefits, the simple 
implication is that non-AFDC Medicaid expenditures may have crowded out AFDC 
Medicaid expenditures and the AFDC benefit itself in  the  state budget; that 
is,  the two may be substitutes  in the state utility function.3 
Plan of Analysis.  The goal of the analysis in  the next  few sections is 
to  test these substitution hypotheses against the data, and to determine 
whether the other possible causes of benefit decline  (caseload growth, 
matching rates, real income growth slowdown) are sufficient by themselves, 
either alone or  in combination, to explain it.  The central difficulty in 
testing the Food Stamp portion of the hypothesis, which is the primary one, is 
that the Food Stamp benefit schedule is set by Congress and therefore does  not 
vary across the states.  Consequently, no  cross—sectional correlation between 
AFDC  and Food Stamp benefits can be estimated. —  22  — 
As  with Medel r,  a variation can be  introduced to  allow  for rational 
perception of the taxation of  AFDC by  the Food Stamp program: 
Model TIA 
Max  liCE 4- (F'  + 4>M,  2)  (15) 
s,t,  Y = P(B +  QM)  + 2  (16) 
F' =F—  .3B  (17) 
which leads to  a demand equation under the null of the form: 
.76 + F  + M = o ÷ 8(1.43)P + y(Y  + (1..43)P(F÷  M) — QPMJ  (16) 
Finally, the influence of  non—AFDC Medicaid expenditures can  be 
incorporated by  modifying the utility function to  allow  a third argument 
representing the transfer to  non—AFOC Medicaid recipients, primarily the aged 
and disabled.  A separate argument is required because the marginal utility of 
transfers fo  the aged and disabled is  likely to  be  quite different from  that 
of transfers to  female heads of  family.  As noted in  the previous section, 
Medicaid transfers to the aged  and disabled are much greater than  to  female 
heads, which could be interpreted as evidence that the marginal utility of 
transfers to the former are higher than to  the latter. 15  — 
In past  studies of the substitution hypothesis, this difficulty has been 
circumvented in various ways.  Orr (1979) conducted a cross—sectional analysis 
in the mid—19705 and regressed the AFDC  benefit on the average Food Stamp 
benefit actually paid in  each state.  The Food Stamp benefit actually paid 
differs across states because of differences in  family size, non—welfare 
income, and the amounts of various deductions in  the benefit formula.4 
However, legislatures are well aware of the difference between a guarantee set 
in  a benefit fornula——which holds family size, other income, etc. constant—— 
and an  actual benefit paid out.  In  setting the guarantee in  the AFDC program, 
state legislatures typically consider only the guarantee in  the Food Stamp 
program in their calculations.  In  addition, econometrically speaking, 
identifying the effect  of Food Stamps by  using variation in  family size and 
other variables requires the assumption that those variables do not  affect 
state AFDC actions directly, which is unlikely to be the case.  Moreover, the 
variation in  family size  and other variables across states is  not very large, 
which could lead to unstable results.  A reanalysis of the Orr data  by Hulten 
et  al. (1982) is consistent with  this possibility, for Hulten et  al. found the 
Food Stamp coefficient  in the Orr model to be  quite sensitive to  the inclusion 
of additional state—specific variables.  Finally, regardless of the legitimacy 
of family size and other such variables as instruments, the cross—sectional 
variation in  the Food Stamp benefit they induce is unlikely to have the same 
effect on the AFDC benefit as will  an upward shift in the entire Food Stamp 
schedule, as  has occurred over time. 
plotnick and Winters (1985) (see also Plotnick  (1986)) used cross— 
sectional variation in the Food Stamp program in  1971 and 1972, when  the 
program was not in place in  all counties.  The Food Stamp benefit was —  16  — 
multiplied  by the fraction of the counties in the state that  had instituted 
the program.  However, as discussed by  Orr  (1979), the states that adopted the 
program first were  the more liberal,  high—benefit states; thus the Plotnick- 
Winters variable runs the risk of  some degree of  endogeneity.  On the other 
hand, Gramlich  (1982) used time—series variation in  the Food Stamp benefit 
from 1974 to 1981 to  estimate the substitution effect.5  Gramlich found his 
results to  be  quite sensitive to the-specification assumed.  This is not too 
surprising for, as  Table  I  above shows, the AFDC benefit fell from 1974 to 
1981 and the Food Stamp benefit fluctuated with  little or no  pattern.  In 
fact, given the long—standing decline of the AFDC benefit prior to 1974 and 
its leveling off after  1981,  it is  unlikely that  the states were in 
equilibrium over  the 1974—1981 period. 
To  avoid these difficulties, this study takes a  more  direct  approach to 
the essentially time—series nature of the hypothesis  (i.e.,  why did AFDC 
benefits decline over a specific calendar period?) by  using cross—sectional 
FDC  benefit equations estimated prior to the introduction of Food  Stamps  and 
Medicaid  to forecast benefits forward to a period in the future when  states 
had  fully adjusted  to  Food Stamps  and Medicaid.  Pre-1965 benefit regressions 
are  used to forecast the effects of changes  in the caseload, matching  rates, 
and  state income on  the benefit,  and  comparisons  of the forecasted  nan 
benefit and the actual mean  benefit are  then used  to  test for structural 
change in the AFDC benefit  equation over time,  and hence for the substitution 
hypothesis.  Some  backcasts are performed  as well by estimating  cross— 
sectional regressions in  1984 and backcasting the PFDC  benefit  to 1960,  and 
some direct pooling across  years  is conducted  to  test for structural  change 
directly.  This  approach  thus avoids the requirement of artificially —  17  — 
generating  cross-sectional variation in  Food Stamps amounts or  of having to 
use AFDC-FoOd Stamp time-series correlations in  the 1970s to test for 
substitution. 
As a method of testing the weak  version of the substitution hypothesis-— 
namely, that there was some substitution though not  necessarily on  a  dollar- 
for—dollar basis——the approach is  rather weak, for it  implies that any 
significant difference between actual  and forecasted AFDC  benefits be  taken as 
a sign of substitution.  Obviously other factors could have been  at  work. 
However, as a method of testing the strong version of the hypothesis--that  the 
substitution was actually one—for—one——the approach is correspondingly strong, 
for it implies that  the forecasted AFDC  benefit should equal a precise dollar 
amount.  The fact that  cross—section  regressions generally track time—series 
variables rather poorly in most  past  applications strengthens the nature of 
the test even more, especially when  the drastic transformations of the welfare 
system in  the late 1960s and early  1970s are recognized. —  18  — 
III.  ZCDELING THE  EFFECT OF FOOD STAt2S 
AND MEDICAID ON AFDC 
Since most  of  the regressions to be  estimated will be based upon only  48 
observations, the models must  be kept  as  simple as possible.  In the simplest, 
the median voter of  each state allocates his income between expenditure on  the 
AFDC  benefit and on  other goods, conditional upon a fixed Food Stamp benefit 
provided by  the federal government,  Unfortunately, the data do not  contain 
informstion rn the income or  the tax price faced by  the median voter, so  the 
mean  voter must  be  used instead as an  approximation. 
Model I 
Max  0(3 + *F, 5)  (1) 
s.t.  Y=PB+Z  (2) 
where  S  is the AFDC  guarantee for a  fixed family size (e.g., four);  F  is 
the Food Stamp guarantee for the same family size;  S  is the per capita 
amount of some other composite good;  Y  is  per capita income in  the state 
after federal taxes but  before state taxes;6 and  P  is the price of the AFDC 
benefit.  P  is  equal to  (C/N))1-s),  where  C  is the AFDC caseload,  N  is 
state population, and  s  is the federal matching rste for AFDC 
expenditures.  Approximating the solution to the maximization problem for  8 
with  a linear demand equation, we  have: —  19  — 
So+8P+yY_/F  (3) 
where  I = I + pPF  is virtual income, incorporating the incume effects 
arising from the federal gift of Food Stamps.  Conventional theory predicts 
that  f  C  0  and  y >  0.  Here interest centers on tests of the null 
hypothesis  H0:  @  1,  under which the demand equation eimplifies to  the 
following; 
B + F  a + p + '(Vt + PF)  (4) 
Thus an increase in  F  of $1  will lower  B  by $1  ,  controlling  for income 
effects.  Hot  controlling  for such effects will generate a reduction of  B  of 
less than $1. 
As  noted in  the previous section, a fully rational voter will  realize 
that the Food Stamp program taxes AFDC  benefits, leading to a variation on 
this model. 
Model IA 
Max  U(B +  4F,  z)  (5) 
s.t.  Y=PB+Z  (6) 
F' = F  — .3B  (7) —  20  — 
which leads  to  the demand  equation 
B  = (o/w)  +  (8/w2)P  +  (y/w)Y - (/w)F  (B) 
where  w = I  — 
.3dy  and  Y = I +  (p/w)PF.  Under  the  null  of  =  1,  the 
equation reduces to: 
.73 + F  = o  + 8(1 .43)P +  yCY + (1  .43)PF]  (9) 
The introduction of the tax rate has, surprisingly, ambiguous effects un 
the level of  the benefit.  To  illustrate,  let  t  be  the tax rate  Ct = .3 
currently).  Substitution of  t  for .3 in  (9)  and differentiation  of (9) 
w.r.t. the tax rate can  be  shown to lead to: 
1  +  (10) 
where  B 
= o + 5P +  '(Y  + PF) — F.  The price effect  (8 <  0)  tends to make 
the tax effect negative, as is  intuitive, but the income effect  (y > 0) 
moves it in  the opposite direction.  itreover, the benefit increases by one 
percent from a unit increase  in  t  because the utility function  now 
contains  B(1—t) + F  as its first argument,  implying that the benefit must be 
increased in  order to leave utility at the same level as previously. 
Perhaps more  important for present purposes, the introduction of this tax 
rate has ambiguous effects on  the substitution effect of  F  on  B.  While  the 
tax rate increases the income effects of  PF in (9),  the same multiplicative —  21  — 
effect of  (l-t)  on  B  implies that the reduction in  B  will be  greater 
than before. 
Medicaid benefits can be  introduced to this model in a similar fashion, 
leading to tdel II. 
Model II 
Max  U(B + F ÷ $M,  Z)  (11) 
s.t.  Y =  P(B  + QM)  + Z  (12) 
where  M  is the insurance value of the Medicaid benefit for AFTJC recipients 
and  Q  is the relative price of medical care.7  The resulting demand  equation 
for  B  can be written; 
B=m+P+1Y—F—M  (13) 
where  '1  = (y + P(JF  + M)  — QPMI.  The income effects in the virtual—income 
terms are in  this case partly negative  (—QPM)  because the  federal  gift  of 
Medicaid  is not free——states must still pay  a share.  If, in fact, the 
positive income effects are equal  but opposite in  sign  ($  Q),  there  are no 
income effects of Medicaid. 
Under the null of  i =  1,  the demand equation becomes: 
B + F  ÷ M = a  ÷ P  +  + P(F  +  M)  — QPMI  (14) —  23  — 
Model III 
Max  ti(B  + pF  +  $M,  MN,  z)  (19) 
s.t.  Y  p(B ÷ QM) + 
2PNMN  ÷ 1  (20) 
where  M is the Medicaid benefit to non—AFDC recipients and  is the 
price of that benefit, equal to  the product of  (1—s)  and the per capita 
caseload in  the non-FDC  portion  of  the  Medicaid program.8  The demand 
equation for  B  now becomes: 
B  a ÷ P +  +  —  pF 
—  M  (21) 
where  Y  is the same  as  in equation (13).  If  Medicaid and non-Medicaid 
expenditures  are gross substitutes,  0.  Under the null of  =  = 1, 
the equation becomes:9 
B + F + M  a + '  +  + iCY  + P(F+M) —  QPMI  (22) 
Once again,  incorporating  the taxation of AFOC  results in a 
modification.  Without stating the maximization problem, suffice it to  state 
that the demand equation under the null in  this case is (t.bdel lIlA); 
.7B + F  + M  a + (1.43)9 +  + '[Y ÷  P(F+M) — QPMI  (23) —  24  — 
Testing  the Nulls.  As discussed in the last sectiun, the appruach taken 
here to testing the nulls of dollar—for—dollar substitution is based upon 
forecasts from cross—section  regressions for  8  estimated prior to the 
introduction  of Food  Stamps  and Medicaid.  The earliest year  for  which  the 
AFDC  guarantee for a  family of four is available is 1960  and  the latest year 
for which it  and the independent variables are available is 1984.  Both years 
can be  reasonably argued to be  equilibrium years, for in  1960 the AFDC system 
had been  stable in  structure and in  caseload growth for over  a decade and in 
1984 the AFDC  benefit appears to  have settled down  after  the transitional 
years in  the lYlOs. Thus cross—sectional regressions of  B  on  P  and  I 
in  1960 can be  used to forecast the AFOC benefit under Models I—TI to  1984, 
and significance tests can be  conducted on  the difference between the 
forecasted and actual mean AFDC  benefit (Model III cannot be  estimated on  1960 
data because data on  are unavailable then)  •  Such  teats  will  indirectly 
determine the extent to which changes in the level of the caseload, matching 
rates, and disposable  income between the years are capable of explaining the 
benefit decline. 
This teat  is a very atrong one because it does not utilize information in 
1984, and because it  therefore teats the joint null of 
U1  =  I  and of no 
structural change in  the equation.  It is implicitly a test of the rational 
expectations forecast under the null of dollar—for—dollar substitution.  A 
statistically symmetrical alternative  is to conduct a set of  tests by 
estimating Modela I—Ill on  the 1984 croas—section and by  using them to 
backcast the 1960 benefit.  Such estimates obviously incorporate different 
information, particularly that on  Medicaid, and Model III can be estimated. —  25  — 
Conditional  upon the  outcome of this analysis, an  obvious further set of tests 
can be conducted  by  pooling the two years and testing directly for structural 
change in the parameters,  thereby  using all the statistical  information in  the 
data. 
The  means of the variables used in the  analysis are shown in  Table 2.11 
As noted previously,  the mean  AFDC  guarantee fell markedly between  1960  and 
1984,  but  Food Stamps and Medicaid  outweighed  the  AF0C decline.  The  caseload 
more than tripled, leading to a large effective price increase.12  The 
matching  rate appears to have increased over the period,  but this is a result 
of the nonlinearity of the matching schedule in 1960,  to be  discussed 
momentarily.  Real disposable  income about doubled from 1960 to 1984. 
Although standard errors are not shown, the data reveal that the addition of 
Food Stamps has lowered the cross—stat  variance in  transfers but  Medicaid has 
raised it  back to  the same level as that of AFDC  alone. 
The nonlinearity of the matching rate schedule in 1960 requires modifying 
the estimation procedure  for the estimates in  that year.3  In 1960 the 
federal government matched state AFOC expenditures at  a 83  percent rate at low 
benefit levels, at a state—specific  'federal" matching rate at  medium benefit 
levels (the mean of which is shown in  Table 2), and at  zero rates for high 
benefit levels.  As is well known from the analysis of piecewise—linear  budget 
sets (Hausman, 1985;  Moffitt, 1986), the demand equation along each segment in 
1960 can  be  written in this case  as 
Ba+P+yY  (24) —  26  — 
Table  2 
Means of the Variables  Used 
in the Analysis 
1960  1984 
465  344 
0  242 
M  0  185 
C/Na,c  13.8  42.8 
579  59.6 
Pc  5.6  17.6 
y  5719  10185 
Q  _d  1.14 
9a,c  0  12.5 
QpC  0  14.8 
Notes 
Data  Sources:  See Appendix  B. 
N = 48 
All  dollar  figures  in  1982  dollars. 
acaseload  lagged  3 years. 
bMultiplied  by 100. 
CMultiplied  by 1000. 
dNot required  for analysis. —  27 
— 
where  p  and  Y  are, respectively, virtual price and income on  a segnnt. 
Their definitions are straightforward and are not written out for brevity. 
Monte Carlo evidence indicates that  OLS estimates of  (24) can give extremely 
biased estimates of  the effects of grants—in—aid  (Megdal, 1987), for 
P  and  Y  are endogenous.  Although the most  efficient method of 
estimation of such models  is maximum likelihood (see Moffitt, 1984, for an 
application to grants—in—aid),  the main analysis presented below will instead 
use the instrumental variable technique of evaluating  the schedule at  the mean 
benefit for all observations.  The mean  benefit in 1960 was in the middle 
segment of the schedule with  matching rate shown in  Table 2.  The implied 
virtual price and income are therefore used in all 1960 regressions.  To test 
the sensitivity of the results to this procedure, maximum likelihood piecewise 
linear constraint (PLc) estimates are obtained as well  on  a subset of the 
models. —  28  — 
IV.  MAIN R8SULTS 
Table 3 shows the results of estimating the 1960 AFDC benefit 
equations.  Column  (1),  the simplest model, shows a significant and positive 
income effect and a negative, though insignificant, price effect.  At the 
means of the data  the coefficients imply price and income elasticities of -.17 
and .98,  respectively.  The near-unity income elasticity  implies that the 
share of income devoted to AFDC should stay  approximately constant as  income 
increases. 
Columns  (2)  and (3)  show the effects of  entering additional  state 
variables for region, urbanization, educational level of the population, and 
other factors.  Region  appears to be moderately  important in explaining 
benefits, with the South showing the lowest benefits, as  expected, and the 
West  and Northeast showing the highest.  However, neither the urbanization 
variables nor the variables added in  column  (3)  are very  significant, and an 
F—test strongly rejects the significance of the incremental variables in  that 
column,  perhaps more important for present purposes, the inclusion of  these 
variables has no  quantitatively important effect on the income coefficient but 
it does reduce the magnitude of the price effects greatly and renders them 
completely insignificant.  Thus  the 1960 data provide weak evidence of price 
effects at  best. 
Forecasts to 1984 are shown in  Table 4 for Models I and II (Model III 
cannot be  forecasted because no  estimate of the parameter  is possible —  29  — 
Table  3 
1960  Benefit Regressions 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
—14117.5  —3032.9  —1962.7 
(8342.0)  (8614.9)  (10070.3) 
a  79.6*  75.1*  63.0* 
(18.9)  (27.1)  (45.4) 
NE  131 •4*  136.8 
(58.6)  (76.0) 
NC  110.4  100.0 
(55.7)  (74.0) 
131 •9*  112.4 
(55.6)  (83.5) 
METPCT  —105.3  —93.8 
(100.0)  (108.7) 
PCHS  1.6 
(6.1) 




Constant  88.9  34.0  1.5 
(132.0)  (132.6)  (227.3) 
R—squared  .41  .54  .54 
Standard  error  125  116  120 
Notes: 
Standard  errors in parentheses. 
*:  Significant  at 5 percent level. 
aMultiplied  by 1000. 
Variable  definitions:  NE,  NC,  W are regional  dummies  for 
Northeast,  North  Central,  and West,  respectively  (South 
omitted);  METPCT  = percent of state population  in 
metropolitan  areas;  PCHS  = percent of population  with  a high 
school  degree;  UN = state  unemployment  rate;  RN  real 
weekly  manufacturing  wage.  Means  given in Appendix Table 
C-i —  30  — 
Table  4 
1960 Forecasts  to 1984 
Model I 
Actual  84-F  585 
Forecast  84-F  645 
Forecast  error  60 
F—statistic  .15 
(p—value)  (.70) 
Standard  error  156 
Model  fl 
Actual  .784-F  482 
Forecast  .784-F  537 
Forecast  error  55 
F—statistic  .07 
(p—value)  (.80) 
Standard  error  214 
Model  II 
Actual  8+F+M  770 
Forecast  8+F4-M  645 
Forecast  error  —125 
F—statistic  .64 
(p—value)  (.43) 
Model hA 
Actual  .784-F4-M  667 
Forecast  .784-F+M  537 
Forecast  error  —130 
F—statistic  .37 
(p—value)  (.55) 
Standard  error  214 —  31  — 
with  the 1960 data),  All forecasts use the coefficients in column  (1) in 
Table 3,14  The forecasted benefit in  1984 is 5645 per month, far above the 
actual AFDC benefit of  $344.  But this forecast is only  $60 above the sum of 
AFDC  and Food Stamps in  1984, a very close forecast.  The forecast is 
insignificantly  different from the actual  value, though this is  partly  a 
result of a fairly high standard error of the prediction  ($156).  The forecast 
of the model under the assumption  that voters recognize the taxation of AFDC 
by the Food  Stamp program (Model IA( is  quite similar, overpredicting the net 
benefit sum by  approximately $55, again insignificantly different from zero. 
When  used to predict for models including Medicaid  (Models II and hA),  the 
1960 regressions underpredict because the Medicaid benefit is  about $180.  The 
forecast error ranges from $125  to $130 but is again insignificantly different 
from zero. 
These 1960—based  forecasts provide considerable support for the full 
substitution hypothesis,  for the forecasts are fairly close given the major 
changes that occurred in  the system between 1960 and 1984, and given the 
fairly large absolute magnitude of the implied increase in the benefit sum 
between the years.  Even for Model II, for example, the implied increase in 
the benefit sum is  $305 ($770 — 465),  and the 1960 regression predicts two— 
thirds of that increase. 
The estimates of  Models I—Ill on  the 1984 data  are presented in 
Table 5,15  The results are for the most  part  quite similar to those in 
1960.  price effects,  though negative, are on the borderline of significance 
at conventional levels in  most of the models.  Even in those models (hA  and 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.—  33  — 
low  (about 12 percent).  Income effects, on  the other hand, are positive and 
significant  in all models.  The implied elasticities center around  .94,  once 
again quite close to unity and therefore again implying constant shares with 
respect to  income.  The effect of non-AFDC expenditures,hown  in the 
estimates for del  III, are completely insignificant, thus indicating no 
substitutability between the expenditures of  the two programs. 
Backcasts to 1960 using the coefficients for each model separately are 
shown in Table 6.  The forecast errors in  general are once again very small, 
especially so  for the models including Medicaid.  Whereas odels I and IA 
underpredict the 1960 AFDC benefit by  $94 to $132, Models II,  hA,  III,  and 
lilA overpredict  by no  more than $41.  The best  models for prediction are 
those which assume rational voters that take account of both  Medicaid and the 
taxation of  AFDC by  the Food Stamp program (Models hA  and lilA), models which 
predict the AFDC benefit to  be only $9—sb  over  its actual valuel  Moreover, 
the F—statistics reject dels  I and IA  most  strongly, and they favor idels 
hA  and lilA the most.  The standard errors of the estimates are quite small 
for all equations.  The 1984 equations are thus even more supportive of  the 
full substitution hypothesis than those for 1960,  especially for the full 
rationality models. 
Estimates for Models III and lilA, the most  complete models, obtained 
by  pooling the 960  and 1984 data are shown in  the last two columns of 
Table 516 Price effects are negative and imply elasticities at the mean  of 
about —12 percent, and income effects are once  again positive and significant, 
implying income elasticities of  about 1.06.  An  F—test for similarity of the 




































































































































































































































.—  35  — 
(F—statistics  of .39 and 1.2 in  Medels III and lilA, respectively).  Thus the 
use of all the information at  hand again strongly supports the  full 
substitution hypothesis. 
Taking  the pooled estimates for Model III as valid, the sources of  the 
increase in  the benefit sum from $465 to $770 between 1960 and 1984 can be 
deduced,  Using  the means for the variables indicates that the increase in 
price pushed down  the benefit by  $80 but that the increase in  disposable 
income pushed it up  by  $364,  the residual ($19)  accounted for by  the 
introduction of  the non—AFDC Medicaid program.  The  relatively  weak effect of 
the  caseload explosion in  the  late  1960s  and  early 1970s in pushing  down  the 
benefit  is consistent with  the consistently weak  price elasticities estimated 
in  both the 1960 and 1984 data.  Thus the bulk of the evidence clearly 
supports an  interpretation that income increases over the past  three decades 
have indeed increased the transfer to female heads, and that the decline in 
the AFDC benefit is  virtually entirely a result of the substitution of Food 
Stamps and Medicaid. 
PLC Estimates.  To test the sensitivity of the estimates to the 
instrumental variable procedure used  to address the piecewise—linearity of the 
1960 matching rate formula, the full maximum likelihood PLC model was 
estimated on the 1960 data and on  the pooled 1960—1984 data for Medels III and 
lIlA.  The exact specification of the model is given in  Appendix A along wito 
the definition of  the log likelihood function. 
The results are shown in  Table 7.  The first column shows the 1960 
estimates, which appear to be  moderately close to  those in  Table 3 (at least 
given some of the large standard errors in both equations) but  are not quite —  — 
Table  7 
Maximum  Likelihood  PLC Estimates 
1960, 1984 Pooled 
1960 
Model  III  Model hA 
_5513.5*  _5267.7*  _3986.7* 
(2869.7)  (1660.1)  (1397.4) 
71.3*  7Q7*  59.1* 
(22.0)  (9.7)  (8.2) 
—  813.6  —240.6 
(2688.7)  (2556.6) 
o  132.2  131.3  174.8* 
(153.1)  (74.4)  (60.1) 
a  123.1*  126.4*  114.3*  e  (17.6)  (10.8)  (10.6) 
a  10.4  10.5  9.4 
(13.0)  (13.3)  (14.9) 
Log  Likelihood  —297.6  —599.47  —590.09 
Unrestricted 
Log  Likelihoodb  ——  —599.45  —588.85 
Notes:  Standard  errors in parentheses. 
*t  Significant at 10—percent  level. 
aMultiplied by  1000. 
bAllows  separate  coefficients for  1968  and  1984. —  37  — 
the  same.  The second and third columns of Table 7  show the estimates of 
Models  III and lilA, respectively, on  the pooled 960—1984 data.  The 
estimates in  this case are very close to those in  the corresponding columns of 
Table 5 and, consequently, generate the same types of backcasts shown in 
Table 6.  Moreover, tests for a change in  structure between the years—— 
obtainable from the unrestricted log likelihoods shown in the table-—are 
strongly rejected  (chi—squared  statistics of .04 and 2.46 in  the two 
equations, respectively).  Thus the instrumental variable procedure used  in 
the previous sections appears to  have generated sufficiently good estimates as 
to allow all the conclusions reached previously  to be retained. 
ffects of Federal Matching.  Given the primary result of the analysis—— 
that lump—sum federal transfers appear to generate dollar-for—dollar 
displacement by  the states——it should be of  interest to determine whether 
traditional federal matching for AFDC may be an  alternative mechanism to 
increase transfers by the states.  As is well—known, the efficacy of matching 
in  general depends upon the magnitude of price elasticities and,  relatedly, on 
the degree to  which federal grants are substituted into other areas of 
expenditure by the states.  The fraction of the AFOC grant substituted into 
other areas of expenditure is calculated as  one minus the ratio of the 
stimulus (i.e., the effect of matching on  the AFDC benefit) to the federal 
grant. 
In a prior analysis (Moffitt, 1984), it  was found that almost 80  percent 
of federal AFDC grants in  1970 were spent on  non-AFDC purposes, implying that 
federal matching stimulates relatively little additional AFDC expenditure by —  38  — 
the  states.  A similar calculation here  implies that out—substitution was 85 
percent in  1960 but only 38 percent in  1984.17  The much  lower out— 
substitution effect in 1984 is a result of two factors,  First, the caseload 
tripled between 1960 and 1984; therefore, a given federal matching rate has a 
much  greater stimulative effect on  the AFOC benefit than it  did previously. 
Second, the mean federal grant has fallen because the mean  benefit has fallen, 
thereby again lowering the percent substituted out.  Thus it  appears that, 
currently; almost two—thirds of  the federal AFDC  grant is indeed used to 
increase state AFDC expenditures, making this strategy considerably rore 
attractive than using Food Stamps to  increase the total transfer.18 —  39  — 
V.  EFFECTS  ON THE  AFDCU  PROGRAM 
The  AFDCU  program is a supplement  to  the  regular  AFDC  program  and 
provides benefits to  low—income families even if an  able—bodied male is 
present in the household.  Eligibility  for such  families is based not only 
upon the usual income and asset conditions in  the regular AFDC program but 
also upon  whether the male  is unemployed and has had a history of sufficiently 
strong attachment to the labor  force.  The  AFDCU  program was  enacted  by 
Congress  and  made optional  to  the  states  in  1961, with matching set at the 
same  rate as that for the regular AFDC  program.  However,  while the ntmnber of 
states adopting the program rose quickly in  the early 196Gm, it leveled off at 
around  50 percent in the late 1960s and has remained approximately at  that 
level since. 
The  Food Stamp supplementation hypothesis explored in the last  section 
would appear to  be of relevance to the growth  of AFDCU  as well.  The  Food 
Stamp program is notable in  the U.S. transfer system for its provision of 
benefits to husband—wife  families,  unlike  the  regular RFDC program,  and  hence 
the Food Stamp program is closer  to being a universal transfer program than 
any  other in  the U.S.  However, the provision of  federally—funded benefits to 
husband-wife families, the same group covered by the AFDCU program, may, by  a 
similar logic to  that discussed for the regular AFDC program, have  discouraged 
the adoption of AFDCU program in  the states.  It should be  noted that AFDC 
benefits  to female—headed families and to husband—wife families are required 
to be the  same for equivalent family sizes and other circumstances, so no —  40  — 
leeway  is  possible to lower the benefit in the AF000 program separately  from 
that in  the AFDC program; the only  decision is to adopt or not to adopt. 
A  simple model that captores the major factors influencing the AF000 
adoption decision is as follows. 
Model TV 
Max  0(3  + 003,  z)  (25) 
s.t.  y = 
(p1  +  DP2)B  + Z  (26) 
where  B  is the common benefit for AFDC  end AFUCU families,  0  is a chznmy 
variable equal to one if the state adopts AFDCU end  0  if not,  and  P1  and 
P2  are the prices for the AFOC and AFDCU programs, respectively (caseload 
times own—payment share).  The parameter  0  measures the marginal utility of 
transfers to  husband—wife couples.  The solution to  the maximization problem 
can be written as  follows: 
=  +  P +  Y  if  0 = 1  (27) 
B = a + OP  +  '(1  if  0 = 0  (28) 




Y)  — 
v(P1, 
yl  (30) —  41  — 
where  — p1  ÷ p2  is the total price if AFDCIJ is adopted  (total per capita 
caseload times own payment share) and  V[p,y)  is the indirect utility 
function. 
Our interest here is less in  the benefit equations than in the AFDCIJ 
choice equation (3O).  The interesting  implication of (30) is that AFDCIJ is 
chosen iff  < ,  or 
D = 1  iff  S >  (p2/p1). 
(31) 
Since  P1  and  P2  are both per capita caseloads times one minus identical 
matching rates, we can  say that AFDCU is adopted only if the marginal utility 
of transferring funds to husband—wife families is greater than the ratio of 
the husband—wife caseload to  the regular female-head caseload.  This result 
implies that increases in  the regular AFDC caseload and decreases in  the 
actual or  potential AFDCU caseload raise the probability  of adopting EDCU, 
both of which are testable implications. 
The criterion in (31)  is notable for its implication that the income 
level of the state has no effect on the probability of adopting AFDCU.  This 
would seem  contrary to any notion of FDCU, and transfers to husband—wife 
families in general, as normal goods.  Clearly this property of (31)  is a 
result of the specification of the utility function and the linear 
indifference curves between the benefits to female—headed families and 
husband—wife families, a restriction which may be  violated.  iowever, this 
restriction does make the model in (25)—(26) testable by  simply determining 
whether income does or does  not affect AFDCU adoption probabilities 
independent of  P1  and  P2.20 —  42  — 
Incorporating Food Stamps in  a manner similar to  that in  the last 
section, we have 
Model V 
Max  IJEB  + ODE  ÷  + *20F,  2]  (32) 
with the budget constraint as in (26).  Note  that Food Stamps are provided to 
husband-wife families regardless of  whether the state has adopted an  AFDCTJ 
program.  Under  the null of  = 2 
= 1,  the demand equations are the 
following: 
B + F  =  +  P  +  ('F  + P  F]  if  D = 1  (33)  1+0  (1+0)2  T  1+6  T 
B + F  = o +  yCY + 
P1 
)1÷0)F]  — OF  if  D = 0  (34) 
0* = V(-j—- Y + PF] 
— 
v(P1,  y + P,(1÷0)F]  (35) 
Mere the demand equations for benefits (33)  and (34)  imply that the Food Stamp 
program lowers the AFDC benefit in  non-AFDCU states more than in  AFDCU states, 
at least ignoring income effects, as a result of the term — OF  in (34) .  The 
source of this effect is simply that non-AFDCIJ  states are initially providing 
nothing to husband-wife families at  all,  and hence the introduction of Food 
Stamps has an  overly strong substitution effect on the AFDC benefit. —  43  — 
More  important  for  present purposes, equation (35(  implies that, contrary 
to expectations, the AFDCU adoption decision is actually independent of toe 
Food Stamp benefit, aside from income effects.  The latter are certain to be 
insignificant, as the increase in  virtual income created by  the Food Stamp 
program is about one-tenth of one percent of income.  Thus the AFDCU criterion 
function is essentially equivalent to that in  the prior model, as given by 
(31  )——only relative prices matter.  The independence of the AFDCU decision 
from the Food Stamp benefit again arises from the linear indifference curves 
in  the particular utility function postulated, and is once again empirically 
testable. 
A modification to incorporate Medicaid benefits leaves the model 
virtually unchanged. 
Model VI 
Max  U[(B + M)(1+D)  + F(1+O),  Z  (36) 




+ ct4)  + I  (37) 
under the null of full substitution of Medicaid and Food Stamps for AFDC. 
Note that the provision of Medicaid benefits is tied to  the provision of 
AFDCTJ, for husband-wife families are generally eligible for Medicaid only if 
they are AFOC  recipients.  The criterion function for AFDCU adoption is  the 
following: —  44  — 
D* = 





VIP1,  Y  + 
P1(F(1+&) 
+ M) — 
P1QMI  (38) 
Ignoring income effects, which will be trivial, the criterion function for 
AFOCU  adoption is once again the same as that  in (31). 
Econometric Tests.  To  test the various hypotheses implied by the model, 
a before-and—after strategy similar to that in  the last section is taken.  The 
"pre'  year is,  in this case, taken to  be 1968,  The year  1960 is not 
appropriate because AFDCU was not available at  that date, and  earlier dates 
are too close to  1961  to  have allowed the slower—acting states to  adopt  the 
program if they  so  desired.  The "post" year is again taken as 1984,  the 
latest year for which all data are available.  In  1968 44  percent of the 
states had adopted AFDCU and in  1984 48  percent had; thus there was virtually 
no change between the two dates. 
At each year, probit equations for AFDCU adoption are estimated using as 
independent variables the regular AFOC price variable  evaluated in 
1968 on  the mean segment, and proxies for the AFDCU caseload.  Since the AFDCU 
caseload is observed only  for states actually adopting the program, standard 
selectivity bias problems would arise if  caseload data were directly used. 
Two proxy variables are employed instead:  (1)  the male unemployment rate in 
the state, assumed to be  positively related to the actual or potential AFDCU 
caseload, and  (2)  the real weekly manufacturing wage in  the state (most 
workers in  manufacturing are male), taken to be  inversely related to the —  45  — 
actual or  potential AFDCU caseload.  Other variables that may be  of interest 
(male wage rates, earnings, etc.) are not available.  The means of the 
variables for the two years are shown in  Appendix Table 0—2. 
Table B shows the results of  the probit exercises.  Column  (1)  shows a 
probit equation estimated on the 1968 data alone.  The price of the regular 
AFDC caseload has a strong and significant positive effect on the AFDC[J 
probability, as  predicted by the models.  The magnitude of the coefficient 
implies that a ten—percent increase in  the AFDC  price increases the adoption 
probability by  9  percentage points at  the mean.  The manufacturing wage and 
the male unemployment rate both have the expected signs—-increases in  male 
wages and  decreases in  male unemployment make the cost of  adoption lower——but 
both effects are weak  statistically, largely a result of the small sample 
sizes.  The state income variable is also included and, interesting, is 
positive but insignificant, implying that income may have no  effect 
independent of  the prices  of AFDC and  AFDC1J benefits.  Thus there is tentative 
support for the model in the 1968 data. 
Columns  (2)  and (3) show  results obtained by pooling the 1968 and 1984 
observations.21  Column  (2)  shows that the price and income variables retain 
their same signs and significance levels in  the pooled data, but a  dunmy for 
1984 is strongly significant and negative.  A test for a change in the 
parameters other than the intercept from 1968 to  1984 was rejected, but the 
significant change in the intercept is consistent with a substitution effect 
of  the Food Stamp program and hence inconsistent with the restrictive 
parameterization  of the utility functions in iodels IV—VI.  The source of tne 
downward shift in  AFOCU probabilities  is primarily the strong increase in the —  46  — 
Table  8 
AFDCU  Probit  Regressions 
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—22.34  —35.00  —33.17 —  47  — 
caseload  over the 1970s, which, according to  the strong end positive caseload 
effects, should have generated an increase in AFDCU adoption from 1968 to 
1984.  The failure of the fraction of states adopting the program to  grow past 
the late 1960s—-about the  time Food Stamps were introduced--is thus attributed 
in the regression  to the intercept and hence  to a  structural shift downward. 
Since PFDCtJ is commonly strongly associated with  the northeastern 
industrial states, which also  have high  caseloads, column  (3) reports the 
results of  adding a regional dummy for the Northeast.  The addition of the 
dummy does reduce the magnitude of  the downward structural shift, though it 
remains significant.  However, the caseload effect is  unchanged and the 
effects of  manufacturing wages and sale unemployment rates increase in both 
magnitude and significance, thus strengthening their support of the relevant 
hypotheses. —  48  — 
VI.  SUMMARY  AND  IMPLICATIONS 
This  study has examined the causes of the decline in  real AFDC benefits 
over  the 1970s and 1980s and has focused on  testing the hypothesis that states 
have allowed Food Stamps and Medicaid to substitute for AFOC in  the total 
benefit package provided to  female heads in  the U.S.  The analysis is 
conducted by forecasting benefits in the 1980a from cross—section regressions 
in  the 1960s, backcasting benefits in the 19605 from cross—section regressions 
in the 1980s, and pooling data  from both periods to test directly for 
structural change.  The results support the strong version of the substitution 
hypothesis, that for which substitution occurs on a dollar—for—dollar bests. 
The evidence is stronger in  support of the hypothesis that both  Food Stamps 
and Medicaid have substituted for AFDC than that Food Stamps alone has done 
so,  for some tests reject the Food—Stamps—only model.  Additional results 
suggest that the Food Stamp pr ram has also slowed the adoption of the AFDCU 
program. 
There are several implications of the findings of  the paper.  First, the 
basic result that the transfer package has increased over time in  line with 
the growth of income suggests that the benefit will continue to grow  in  the 
future, at least to the extent that  income growth also  maintains its past 
pattern.  Thus thers is no  reason in  these results to  expect  any decline in 
redistribution. —  49  — 
Second,  the results imply that  lump—sum transfer programs enacted by 
Congress have no  effect on the total transfer, and therefore on  the net 
incomes, of low—income female heads.  Instead, they  merely displace cash 
transfers with in—kind transfers.  As a matter of perhaps naive political 
speculation, one may wonder why Congress has enacted such a programF the 
answer may  be that there are stronger political lobbies (agriculture, 
hospitals) behind in-kind transfers than behind cash  transfers.  Be that as it 
may, the implication is that Congress simply does not have the ability to 
increase transfers, at  least not in  this fashion.  Instead, it can  only 
provide a large measure of budget relief to the states. 
There are, of course, other policies available to  Congress should it 
truly wish  to  increase the level of transfers.  As discussed in  the paper, 
heavier use of  matching  rates would provide nontrivial price incentives, at 
least on  average.  Alternatively, federalization of the AFDC  program would 
directly  eliminate the ability of states to  counter federal transfer policy, 
or  the establishment of a minimum benefit would constrain that ability. 
Optimal federal policy under these conditions should be  a topic for future 
research. —  50  — 
APPENDIX  A 
LIKELIHOOD  FUNCTION  FOR THE  PLC  £4DDEL 
The  PLC  model for 1960 is the following: 
B!=o+$P.. +y&..  +e.  (Al)  1  J1  J1  1 
B  = B!  + v.  (A2)  1  1  1 
where  B is the observed  benefit,  Bt  is the "desired"  (i.e., utility— 
maximizing)  benefit,  is the virtual price  on segment '  is 
virtual  income on segment  j,  a.  is  heterogeneity  error, and  u. 
"random"  error.  The error  terms  a.  and  v.  are assumed  to be normally  and 
independently  distributed  with  respective  variances  o and  o. 
Virtual 
price  and income are equal  to: 
•  =  (.17)(C/N.)  (A3) 
ii  1  1 
P  •  =  (1-s.)(C./N.)  (A4)  2i  1  1  1 
93. 
= (C/N)  (As) 
•  =  (A6)  11  1 —  51  — 
Y  = Y  +  (p  p  (B  (Afl 
21  ii  2i  11  Ii 
= I  + (P  P  )B  CAB) 
3i  2i  11  2i.  21 
where  C and  N1  are  the state  caseload  and population,  respectively, 
and  Bi. 
and  2  are the  two kink points in the constraint.  The log 
likelihood  function  to be  triaxinized  w.r.t.  the parameters  a, 5, y,  o, 
and  o  is 
V 
L  =  log g(B)  (A9) 
where  g  is the density  function  for  B.  When  1984 is included  in the 
estimation,  an extra  term  for a linear  regression  equation  is  added  to (P9). 
The density  function g  is defined  as the following: 
g(B) 
= Prob (c.  1i-  a — 5P1 
r.+ v,= B.— a — 
5P.—  yY) 
+ Prob (B a -  — 2i 1Y2i i 
8  1i> 
+ Prob 1i—  2i 1121<  B21 
a — 2i  2i' 
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where  f  and  F  are the unit  normal  density  and distribution  functions, 
respectively,  and 
z  = (B.—  —  .—  (All)  ii  1  ii 
z2. 
= (B.—  — 2i  (A12) 
z3.  a — P3—  (A13) 
u1. 
= (B_ 5li0v  (A14) 
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APPENDIX B 
DATA SOURCES 
B:  Real AFDC Guarantee  for a Family of  Four.  1960:  U.S. Houae 
Committee on  Ways and Means, Background Material and Data  on  Programs within 
the Jurisdiction of  the Committee on  Ways and Means,  1987 Edition, pp. 660— 
662.  1984:  Unpublished data, Office of  Family Assistance, Department  of 
Health and Human Services.  Nominal guarantees deflated by the personal 
consumption  expenditure deflator  (POE)  for the GNP accounts. 
F:  Real Food  Stamp Guarantee  for a Family of Four.  1984:  U.S. House 
Committee on  Ways and Means, Background Material ...,  p. 504.  Deflated by  the 
POE. 
M:  Real Medicaid Insurance Value.  1984:  Calculated by  multiplying  the 
average Medicaid expenditure  for an  AFDC family of four by  the ratio of AFDC 
families having Medicaid expenditures to all AFDC families.  The average 
Medicaid expenditure for an AFDC  family of four is calculated by  siinming  the 
average Medicaid expenditure  per AFDC adult and the average Medicaid 
expenditure per AFDC dependent times three.  Medicaid expenditures obtained 
from unpublished data  of the Nealth Care Financing Administration;  AFDC data 
source described below.  Deflated by  Q  (see below) 
C:  AFDC Caseload.  196D:  Number of families and number of recipianns 
from Social Security Administration,  Social Security Bulletin, November  1960, 
p. 55.  1984:  Office  of Research and Statistics, Quarterly Public  Assisoanoe 
Statistics, July—September  1984, Table 1 —  55  — 
N:  PopulatIon.  1960, 1984:  Bureau of Economic Roalysis, State personal 
Income:  1929—1982. 
s:  Matching Rate.  1960:  unpublished data  provided oy  0. Orr.  1984: 
Social Security Administratlcn,  pnnual Statistical  Supplenent of the Social 
Security Bulletin,  1983. 
Y:  Real  Disposable  Income Per Capita.  1960, 1984:  Real per capita 
income obtained from  BEA, State Persona Inome....  1960:  Federal taxes 
obtained from Bureau of tne Census, Statlstital Rostract of tne  1.5.,  1964 
Edition.  1984:  Federal taxes obtained from Internal Revenue Service, 501 
Bulletin, Fall 1986.  Taxes divided oy  population.  Deflated  by  PCE. 
PN:  price of Non—AFDC BeJicid Benefit.  Caseload  of non—AFOC Bedicaid 
recipients obtained from  unpublished HCFA  data;  population  as referenced 
above; matching rate as referen'ed above. 
Q:  Price  of Medical Care.  State—specific  medical care index for 1980 
obtained from  T. Grannerlann  and B.  Pauly  (1983, pp. 109-110).  Converted to 
1984 value using the medical care component of the OPI. —6  — 
Appendix  Table C-i 
Means  of  Other  Variables 
Used in Main Analysis 
1960  1984 
NE  .19  .19 
NC  .25  .25 
W  .23  .23 
PCHS  41.40  66.91 
METPCT  .51  .61 
UN  5.41  7.32 
RN  265.15  323.06 —  — 
Appendix  Table C-2 
Means of Variables in the 
AFDCU Analysis 
1968  1994 
D  .44  .48 
a  8.58  17.6 
Real  Manufacturing 
Wage 
303.03  323.06 
Male  Unemployment 
Rate 
3.91  6.46 
b  7.28  10.19 
.19  .19  Northeast 
Notes 
n = 48 
aMUlP14Cd by  1000. 
bDiVided by  1000 —  SB  — 
NOTES 
1 •  An  additional  question  is whether  the changes  in  the caseload  are 
explainable  by the changes  in  the benefit.  Although  an interesting 
question,  it will  not be examined  here.  However,  some research baa 
indicated  that  cross-section  AFDC  participation  equations  do nut provide 
sufficiently  large benefit  elasticities  to explain  more than  a small 
fraction  of the tripling of the caseloed.  Put differently,  there seers 
to have been a structural  change  in the AFDC participation  equation  over 
the period  1966—1972. 
2.  The AFDC  benefit  per family  shown in Figure  1  peaked  earlier because 
there  was a steady  decline  in the mean AFDC  family  size over  the 
period.  The guarantee  is the appropriate  variable  to  examine. 
3.  These considerations  suggest quite  naturally  that a state  may lump  all 
income—maintenance—related  expenditures  into  a mingle  pot which 
constitutes  e single  argument  in the utility  function.  The state  may 
thus be concerned  in setting  only the share  of its budget  going  toward 
income  maintenance  in  general. 
4.  The Food  Stamp  benefit  is also  affected  by the AFDC  benefit  itself,  but 
Orr used an instrumentel  variables  technique  to remove  this source  of 
endogeneity. 
5.  It  appears  that  only time—series variation  was utilized  because  Cramlich 
regressed  the AFDC  benefit  (or a weighted  sum of AFDC  and the Food  Stamp 
benefit)  on the Food  Stemp  benefit and a set of state dummies,  using  a —  59  — 
cross—section  of states  from 1974 to  1981.  The inclusion  of state 
dummies  sweeps  out any cross—sectional  variation  in Food Stamps,  leaving 
only time—series  variation. 
6.  It is assumed  that federal  taxes are exogenous  to  the median  state  voter, 
being  set instead  by the median  U.S. voter. 
7.  Equation  (12)  assumes  that  AFDC and Medicaid  benefits  are matched  at the 
same rate, as will  be the case  for the years used in the analysis. 
8.  The matching  rate is the same in both portions. 
9.  One could  also test nulls  on  the substitutability of non—AFDC  Medicaid 
expenditures and  AFDC  Medicaid  expenditures,  but this is not directly 
germane  to the question  of interest  here.  In  addition,  of  course, 
perfect substitutability does  not correspond  to a value  of  1  for  the 
utility parameter  6. 
10.  Although  it would be desirable  to improve  the  efficiency  of  the  estimates 
by  pooling  a set of  years  either  before or  after  the transition  period, 
this  is not practical.  The AFOC guarantee  is next  available  in 1964, 
then  in 1968, both years  uncomfortably  close  to the explosive 
transformations  of the 196Os  and the years  in the  1980s earlier than 
1984  are less assuredly  post—adjustment  years. 
11 .  Alaska  and Hawaii  are excluded  because  some  of the variables  are not 
present  for them  in 1960.  Arizona  is also  excluded  because  it has  no 
Medicaid  program. 
12.  The caseload  variable  is lagged  three  years to  avoid  potential 
endogeneity. However,  from past work  (Moffitt,  1984)  it  appears  that 
there  is little difference  in the estimates  when the current  caseload  is 
used. —  60  — 
13.  The benefit schedule in 1984  was linear,  for the states  were then 
employing  the open—ended  Medicaid  matching  schedule  instead  of the 
nonlinear,  convex  "federal"  matching  schedule.  The Medicaid  schedule 
created  a nonconvex  kink  in the overall  budget  set.  Another  reason  for 
avoiding  the late  1960s and 1970s for estimation  is that those  years  were 
a period  of  gradual  switching  from one schedule  to the other, and States 
of  ten did not switch  immediately  when it  was advantageous  for them  to do 
so.  See Orr (1976,  1978) and Moffitt  (1984) for discussions. 
14.  Forecasts  for the estimates  in columns  (2) and (3) of that  table  were 
also  calculated.  Their  point  estimates  were very  close  to those  for 
column (1)  but their standard  errors  of forecast  were  much  higher,  no 
doubt  because  of the larger  number  of insignificant  coefficients  in  those 
regressions. 
15.  Since  H  is included  in virtual  income,  there  is some  endogeneity  in the 
variable.  However,  the Food Stamp and Medicaid  terms in the virtual 
income  variable  are miniscule  in  magnitude,  constituting  less than  one— 
tenth  of one percent  of income,  consequently,  the coefficients  of the 
equations  are virtually  identical  when they  are left  out of virtual 
income. 
16.  To test  for random  effects,  a sample  estimate  of the variance  of a 
permanent  state effect  was calculated  for Model III.  The estimated 
variance  was less than zero (negative variances  are possible  in such 
ANOVA calculations), from  which  it was concluded  that the data from the 
two years  could  be safely  pooled  and the equations  estimated  with OLS. —  61  — 
17.  This calculation  uses the coefficients  in Model III in Table  5, but the 
mean benefits,  matching  rates,  and so on for 1960 and 1984 separately. 
18.  The price  elasticity  in  the equation  is —.13 as compared  to the —.08 
elasticity  in Moffitt  (1984).  This is responsible  for part  of the 
difference  between  the results  in the earlier  study  and those here,  but 
not the major  part. 
19.  partly  for this reason,  only the AFDCIJ  choice  equation  will be estimated 
below  and not the benefit  equations.  But in  addition,  there  are too few 
observations  to estimate  separate  benefit  equations  on AFDCU  and non— 
AFDCU  states. 
20.  Allowing  the transfer  to husband—wife  families  to constitute  a separate 
argument  in the utility  function——e.g.,  tJ(B,B,Z)——makes the derivation 
of demand  functions  for  B  and properties  of  D*  intractable,  the 
difficulty  arising  because  the first two arguments  are constrained  to 
equality. 
21.  Given the evidence  of weak state—specific  effects obtained  in  the last 
section,  no error  components  models  were estimated. 62  — 
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